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Global structural factors both monetary and real played a prominent role in the burst of 
subprime crisis: 1) the Bretton Woods II international monetary system; 2) the reduction 
of  US  real  investment  return  compared  with  competing  countries.  We  develop  a 
theoretical model to analyze the impact of these factors and macroeconomic policies on 
US  current  account  and  asset  prices.  The  excess  saving  of  U.S.  nonfinancial 
corporations  from  2000-2001  has  undermined  the  stability  of  the  Bretton  Woods  II 
system. Accommodative US monetary and fiscal policies have mitigated the imbalances 
but in the long term structural factors have prevailed. Only a recovery of US real capital 
profitability  can  ensure  long  run  coexistence  between  present  model  of  global 
development and current international monetary system. 
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In the decade prior to subprime crisis the US economy has been characterized by three 
stylized facts (see figure 1): 
1)  the explosion of current account deficit, rose from 111.2 billion dollars in 1997 
(1,4% of GDP and 11,6% of exports of goods and services) to 720.9 billion 
dollars in 2007 (5.2% of GDP and 43.4% of exports); 
2)  the continuous increase in household total net borrowing
2, grew by 42.7 billion 
dollars in 1997 (0.5% of GDP) to 332.9 billion dollars in 2007 (2.4% of GDP), 
with a peak in 2005 to 446.1 billion dollars  (3.6% of GDP)
3; 
3)  the emergence of long speculative bubbles in financial and real estate markets, 
which led to a total revaluation of the US assets of 28,617.3 billion dollars (24% 
of cumulated GDP)
4. 
The three stylized facts are closely linked. Far from being merely internal to the US 
economy, they depict the global imbalances that have led to the crisis of 2007-2008 
                                                 
1 University of Urbino, Italy. I would like to thank Pietro Alessandrini, Giorgio Calcagnini and Michele 
Fratianni for very useful discussions and comments. 
2  This  indicator  differs  from  FFA’s  net  financial  investment  because  total  net  borrowing  excludes 
financial ownership (equities, shares of mutual funds, security credit, life and pension fund reserves and 
miscellaneous assets).  
3 During this period, households total net borrowing stock position has changed sign from + 56,2 billion 
dollars (+ 0,7% of GDP) in 1997 to – 3,298.4 billion dollars (- 23,7% of GDP) in 2007. 
4 25,380.6 billion dollars arising from capital gains of households and 860.1 billion dollars arising from 
the revaluation of financial assets held by non-residents.  
  3 
(Portes 2009). Understanding the causes of the crisis requires an explanation of the 
relationship between these three stylized facts. In this regard the interpretations differ in 
the economic literature. 
Figure 1: Three stilized facts 














































































































































The  conventional  view  identifies  the  cause  of  growing  global  imbalances  in  an 
increased  US  demand  for  imports  accompanied  by  a  fall  in  US  national  saving 
(Blanchard, Giavazzi and Sa 2005). The main responsibility for this situation lies in 
excessively expansionary macroeconomic policies (Eichengreen and Park 2006, Bems, 
Dedola and Smets 2007). Some authors have focused attention on a renewed version of 
the  “twin  deficit  hypothesis”  due  to  the  sharp  increase  in  budget  deficit  from  the 
beginning of the millennium (Chinn 2005, Frankel 2006, Bartolini and Lahiri 2006). 
The main theoretical difficulty with this hypothesis is to explain the revaluation of US 
assets beyond generic assumptions on markets inefficiency (Kraay and Ventura 2007). 
Other  authors  have  stressed  the  role  of  an  accommodative  monetary  policy  in  
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determining the excess of total domestic demand which translates into external current 
deficit (Truman 2005, White 2007). In this case the excess liquidity would also be the 
basis for an inflationary process in asset prices (Rueffer and Stracca 2006). 
Empirical evidence is not fully consistent with the conventional view. On the one hand, 
budget and current account deficits show a weak or even negative correlation (Cavallo 
2005, Erceg, Guerrieri and Gust 2005, Kim and Roubini 2008). On the other hand, the 
influence of monetary policy on external balance is marginal and restricted to the short 
run (Meyer, Neumann and Wegleitner 2006, Burrell and Hurst 2007). Macroeconomic 
policy alone can not account for long persistence and growing dimension of US internal 
and external imbalances. Gruber and Kamin (2007) find that global imbalances are not 
explained either by adding to policy factors other traditional variables (demographic 
variables, per capita income, output growth and economic openness). Financial crises, 
instead,  appear  to  have  significantly  contributed  to  the  emergence  of  substantial 
surpluses in East Asia countries. 
From the influential speeches of the Governor of the Fed on “saving glut” (Bernanke 
2005 and 2007), an alternative framework has emerged. In this hypothesis, the three 
stylized facts are explained as a result of an exogenous increase in international demand 
for  dollar-denominated  financial  assets.  Numerous  works  have  appeared  that  aim  to 
show how the imbalance of the US current account is an endogenous product of global 
economy  resulting  from  differences  in  financial  development  between  countries. 
According to this interpretation, China and other Asian emerging economies reacted to 
the crisis of 1997-98 with an exogenous increase of saving, not offset by an increase of 
investment  (Park  and  Shin  2009).  This  “saving  glut”  derives  from  precautionary 
measures to avoid speculative attacks against currencies of Asian export-led emerging  
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economies. Capital flows are directed to the US in search of liquid and sophisticated 
financial assets, not available elsewhere. Global shortage of assets would be the origin 
of  historic  decline  in  long-term  interest  rates  and  increasing  US  external  deficit 
(Caballero 2006).  
Until the outbreak of the crisis, the US external imbalance could seem the result of an 
equilibrium position in the global economy without need for rapid adjustments in the 
short  term  (Mendoza,  Quadrini  and  Rios-Rull  2007,  Cooper  2007,  Caballero,  Farhi, 
Gourinchas  2008a).  Subsequently,  other  studies  have  highlighted  the  link  between 
excess liquidity in US financial markets, households debt and growth of speculative 
bubbles (Caballero, Farhi, and Gourinchas 2008b).  In this context, the new model of 
banking based on securitization and “originate and distribute" triggers global instability 
trough  the  transformation  of  subprime  mortgages  into  derivatives  (Mizen  2008, 
Brunnermeier 2009). 
Both interpretations, the conventional one and the "saving glut" hypothesis, ultimately 
attribute the crisis to wrong or imprudent behaviour of public actors (government and 
Central Bank) and private (financial intermediaries). Through a new system of rules, 
based on new constraints and incentives to encourage proper behaviour, it would be 
possible to restore the lost conditions of global economic and financial stability (Siebert 
2008, Issing at al. 2009) 
The purpose of this work is to show how more structural factors, along with incorrect or 
fraudulent behaviour, contributed to unsustainable enlargement of  global imbalances 
and rising of speculative bubbles in US asset markets. These factors include: a) the 
international  monetary  system  emerged  after  the  Asian  crisis  of  1997-98,  known  as 
Bretton Woods II, with an enhanced role of the dollar as international currency; b) a  
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decline in the relative rate of return on real investment within the US after the burst of 
the dot-com bubble in 2000-2001. The first factor acts on international demand side for 
US financial assets, while the second on domestic supply side.  
In  the  model  presented  in  next  sections  as  in  “saving  glut  hypothesis”,  US  current 
balance and asset prices are endogenous results of international demand for and supply 
of dollar-denominated financial assets. However, unlike the “saving glut” hypothesis, 
long  run  stability  depends  mainly  on  US  internal  factors,  specifically  on  the  sector 
composition of net domestic financial debt. Moreover, unlike the “conventional view”, 
monetary and fiscal policies in the US (as well as in the EU) appear to have acted in the 
right  direction  of  reducing  imbalances  without  being  able  to  reverse  the  tendency 
towards crisis.  
The conclusion that follows is that Bretton Woods II system guarantees financial global 
stability only in presence of adequate expected profitability of real capital in the US 
compared with competing countries. The weakening of this condition since 2001 has 
resulted in the emergence of speculative bubbles in US asset markets and unsustainable 
current deficits enlargement. The inevitable result was the crisis erupted in 2007-2008.  
In the next future the status of the dollar as international currency can not be considered 
in the abstract. It will depend on structural and political developments of the US as well 
as the emerging economies.  
The paper is structured as follows. Sections 2 to 4 present a model of the US economy 
to illustrate the effects on the external deficit and asset prices, arising from changes in 
net  demand  for  international  liquidity,  monetary  and  fiscal  policies  and  expected 
profitability  on  US  real  capital.  In  Section  5  the  results  of  the  model  are  used  to  
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reconstruct  the  causes  of  subprime  crisis  and  their  relations  with  the  international 
monetary system. Finally, section 6 offers some concluding remarks. 
 
2. International net demand for US financial assets. 
 
Empirical  evidence  does  not  confirm  the  thesis  about  differences  in  financial 
development  as  cause  of  global  imbalances.  In  particular,  no  correlation  was  found 
between global imbalances and differences in financial structures, or between current 
deficits and quality of financial products (Gruber and Kamin 2008). In a pure market 
approach the question of why massive capital flows are directed towards US financial 
markets remains open. To find a plausible answer is then appropriate to refer to specific 
historical and institutional features of US financial assets as vehicles of international 
liquidity. 
After the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system and transition to flexible exchange 
rates between major currencies, it seemed that there was more role for the concept of 
international  liquidity  (Clark  and  Polak  2002).  From  the  Asian  crisis  of  1997-98, 
instead,  the  accumulation  of  assets  in  foreign  currencies  (especially  dollars)  by 
emerging and oil-exporting countries has been growing without interruption (Obstfeld, 
Shambaugh and Taylor 2008). This fact was explained by the appearance of a new 
version  of  the  Bretton  Woods  system
5,  the  so-called  Bretton  Woods  II,  based  on  a 
renewed exchange rates regime pegged to dollar (Dooley, Folkerts-Landau and Garber 
2004). This new international monetary system is based on mutual interests between US 
                                                 
5 See Eichengreen (2004) for a discussion of the similarities and differences between the old and new 
Bretton Woods system.  
  8 
and emerging countries. On the one hand, emerging countries can keep their currency 
undervalued in order to pursue an export-led growth model. On the other hand, US can 
easily finance current account deficits and fully exploit “exorbitant privilege” as “world 
venture capitalist” borrowing short and lending long (Gourinchas and Rey 2007).  
Empirical studies have confirmed this interpretation. Since the end of the Nineties, the 
number  of  currencies  partially  or  totally  de  facto  pegged  to  dollar  is  significantly 
increased. This is due in particular to mercantilist exchange rate policies of emerging 
countries (Clark, Zenaidi and Trabelsi 2008). 
In this context the distinctive feature of US financial assets resides in the fact that they 
are denominated in dollars and the dollar performs the typical functions of a world 
currency:  medium  of  exchange,  unit  of  account  and  store  of  value  (Kenen  2003, 
McKinnon  2004).  With  the  liberalization  of  capital  movements  and  deregulation  of 
financial  markets,  the  concept  of  international  liquidity  has  expanded  well  beyond 
official reserves held by Central Banks. In a first step the concept was expanded to 
borrowed reserves, that is to all available resources in foreign currency that Central 
Banks  can  mobilize  trough  borrowing  in  domestic  or  international  private  capital 
markets (Horne and Nahm 2000). Subsequently, the concept of international liquidity is 
still extended to include virtually all assets held or borrowed by domestic residents and 
tradable in international organized markets (Caballero and Krishnamurthy 2000).  
The principal component of international liquidity is net acquisition of US financial 
assets. Indeed, the euro, despite having increased its role as a store of value, is still far 
from eroding the role of the dollar as a medium of exchange and unit of account (Galati 
and  Wooldridge  2009).  Even  using  a  new  very  broad  concept  of  global  currencies,  
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including  domestic  and  international  use  and  overall  status  of  financial  markets  in 
global economy, the dollar retains all its pre-eminence (Thimann 2008). 
Net  demand  for  US  financial  assets  from  Rest  of  World  may  then  be  regarded  as 
exogenous net demand for international liquidity. Similarly to domestic money demand, 
demand  for  international  liquidity  consists  of  three  components:  transactions, 
precautionary  and  speculative.  We  assume  the  following  standard  hypotheses:  a) 
transactions and precautionary demands depend positively by income and exports of 
Rest  of  World;  b)  speculative  demand  depends  positively  by  total  return  on  dollar-
denominated assets and negatively by total return on assets denominated in currencies 
other than dollar.  
To simplify the notation of the model we consider asset total return as given by the 
interest rate plus a risk premium in terms of capital gains differentiated according to the 
riskiness of assets: 
(1)  trn = in + ∆ PVn 
with: 
tr = asset total return; 
i = interest rate; 
∆ PVi = asset price change for n = US, Rest of World. 
To  complete  the  assumptions  is  convenient  to specify  the  type  of  expectations.  We 
suppose that the information is not perfectly distributed among all players. This is a 
realistic hypothesis for the global economy in which each agent has a particular view of 
the world, conditioned by its economic and geographical location. In this case, as shown 
by  Morris  and  Shin  (2006),  a  small  amount  of  uninformed  agents  produces  wide 
phenomenon  of  persistence  in  aggregate  expectations  despite  the  presence  of  many  
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forward-looking  agents.  Consequently,  our  hypothesis  is  that  of  backward-looking 
expectations. This implies that the demand for and supply of assets are influenced by 
the current level of asset prices that embody expectations about future capital gains. 
Finally we assume that exchange rates are pegged to dollar by the monetary authorities 
of Rest of World in accordance with the Bretton Woods II view of actual international 
monetary  system.  Therefore,  net  demand  for  international  liquidity  is  unaffected  by 
exchange rates movements. 
We can then represent the international net demand for US financial assets (AF
d




US = d1 YRW + d2 XRW + d3 iUS + d4 PV$ – d5 iRW – d6 PVN$  
with: 
YRW = income of Rest of World; 
XRW = exports of Rest of World; 
iUS = US interest rate; 
iRW = interest rate in Rest of World; 
PV$ = dollar-denominated asset prices; 
PVN$ = prices of assets denominated in currencies other than dollar. 
 
3. International net supply of US financial assets. 
 
Net demand for dollar-denominated financial assets has its counterpart in corresponding 
net financial liabilities issued by US residents, that is in net supply of US financial 
assets to Rest of World.  
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In  national  accounts  the  current  account  of  balance  of  payments  is  identical  to  the 
excess saving (S) on investment (I) of total economy and represents the change in net 
asset position of the country. Thus the net supply of US financial assets to Rest of 
World (AF
s
US) is the sum from past to present of current account deficits: 




M = US imports of goods and services; 
X = US exports of goods and services. 
The players who, through financial intermediation, provide financial assets for Rest of 
World are households (H), firms (F) and government (G).  Therefore: 
(4)  AF
s
US = ∑ (M - X)US  = ∑ [(I - S)H
  + (I - S)F + (I - S)G] 
We  now  look  separately  the  three  sources  of  financial  asset  net  supply  for  Rest  of 
World. 
a) Households 
We define household investment as the acquisition of real estate and equities
6 and we 
suppose that US residents do not have assets in currencies other than dollar. We assume 
that households borrowing depends on: a) a portfolio factor given by the difference 
between the total return on asset investment and the cost of debt and b) a dimensional 
factor related to the US income (YUS): 
(5)  (I – S)H = Θ (tr$ – iUS) + h1 ∆ YUS 
Considering equation (1) we can then write: 
                                                 
6 Household investment does not include consumer durable goods, in accordance with the definition used 
in the Integrated Macroeconomic Accounts for the United States that exclude this item from the net 
capital formation (Teplin et alt. 2006). In this way, household investment consists of the purchase of 
residential  property  and  equity  shares  from  the  business  sector.  This  definition  implies  that  firms 
investment is equal to net capital formation minus new share issues. The criterion used is to allocate the 
investment to who bears the risk.   
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US)H = household net supply of financial assets to Rest of World. 
Since households do not issue directly financial assets, household supply to Rest of 
World takes place indirectly trough banking intermediation and household debt consists 
of bank loans. Expression (6) indicates that households obtain net credit in the form of 
bank loans secured by the revaluation of assets in their portfolio as well as by their 
income.  This  was  a  common  practice  in  the  US  before  the  outbreak  of  the  crisis, 
especially in the form of home equity extraction (Greenspan and Kennedy 2007). 
b) Firms 
Firms rely on credit when the desired variation of capital stock exceeds the internal 
funds  available.  The  capital  stock  desired  by  firms  depends  positively  on  expected 
return of real investment and negatively on cost of borrowed funds. Based on these 
simple assumptions we  can state that US  firms net debt is positively  related to  US 
expected real investment return (r
e
US) and negatively to US interest rate: 
(7)  ∑ (I – S)F = f1  r
e






US)F = firms net supply of US financial asset to Rest of World. 
c) Government 
The  excess  of  US  government  investment  on  saving  is  given  by  the  public  budget 
deficit, determined by fiscal policy. Therefore the government net supply of financial 
asset to Rest of World, (AF
s
US)G , is equal to the public debt: 
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G = public expenditure; 
T = tax. 
From previous assumptions the net supply of US financial assets for Rest of World can 
be written as follows: 
(9)  AF
s
US = Θ PV$  + h1 YUS +  f1  r
e
US – f2  iUS + ∑ (G – T)US 
 
4. Asset prices boom and current account imbalances in Bretton Woods II system. 
 
Exogenous variables of the model are: a) US budget deficit determined by fiscal policy; 
b)  US  interest  rate  determined  by  monetary  policy;  c)  US  firms  expected  real 
investment return; d) US income; e) income and exports of Rest of World; f) foreign 
interest rate determined by monetary policies in Rest of World; g) revaluation of assets 
denominated in currencies other than dollars. Because interest rates and exchange rates 
are set by policy authorities, balance between demand and supply is achieved through 
changes in US external position and US asset prices. The endogenous variables are thus 
US external debt and prices of dollar-denominated assets
7. 
The model is in equilibrium when net international liquidity demand matches net U.S 





US = ∑ (M – X)US 
Solving the model for the endogenous variables we obtain the following solutions: 
(11)  PV$ = β [ (EX
d




                                                 
7 The theoretical underpinning of the model fits into a post-Keynesian framework because Central Bank 
controls interest rates and not quantity of money, wealth effects arising from assets revaluation influence 
macroeconomic behaviour and finally investment demand is autonomous and independent. For a review 
of Post-Keynesian features see Lavoie (2006) and Godley and Lavoie (2007).  
  14 
(12)  ∑(M – X)US = Θβ  EX
d
RW – (Θβ – 1) [∑(G – T)US + f1   r
e
US + h1 YUS] + 




RW = d1 YRW + d2 XRW – d5  iRW – d6  PVN$  
β = 1 / [Θ –  d4] 
To analyze the equilibrium solutions of the model is crucial to know the value of the 
coefficient β.  
In particular we assume that β > 0 and consequently Θ β > 1. 
This assumption is verified if: 
(13)  Θ > d4. 
The economic meaning of (13) is that wealth effects arising from changes in prices of 
dollar-denominated assets are greater for US households than for Rest of the World.  In 
other words, the portfolio composition in dollar-denominated assets of foreign investors 
is more liquid and less risky than that of residents. A positive value of coefficient β is 
therefore a realistic assumption, considering that the households share on US capital 
gains is significantly higher than the corresponding share perceived by Rest of World, 
as it is shows in note 3. Moreover, empirical studies show that since the Asian crisis of 
1997-98 the demand for international liquidity has been little sensitive to the financial 
return because it was by far predominant the precautionary motive (Ainzeman and Lee, 
2007, Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 2007). Another way of considering a positive value of β 
is to assume a greater liquidity preference of foreign asset-holders than domestic ones, 
as  postulated  by  the  classical  hypothesis  of  international  financial  intermediation  as 
cause of external deficit (Kindleberger 1965, Salant 1972).   
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To the condition that β > 0, we can summarize in Table 1 the qualitative effects of 
changes in exogenous variables on U.S external deficit and dollar-denominated asset 
prices. 
 
Table 1: Effects of changes in exogenous variables  
on US external deficit and asset prices 
  US current account deficit  Prices of US assets 
YRW  +  + 
XRW  +  + 
iRW  -  - 
PVN$  -  - 
G - T  -  - 
YUS  -  - 
iUS  +  + 
r
e  -  - 
 
The model can be represented graphically with US external debt in the vertical axis and 
prices  of  US  assets  in  the  horizontal  axis.  Equation  (2)  represents  the  curve  of  
international  net  demand  for  dollar  denominated  assets.  Equation  (9)  represents  the 
curve of  net supply of U.S assets to Rest of World. Both curves are positively inclined. 
Since that β > 0, the supply curve has a slope greater than the demand curve.  
The following graphs assume that when the US external position is in equilibrium there 
is  excess  demand  for  US  financial  assets.  This  assumption  is  consistent  with  the 
existence of an exogenous net demand for US financial assets arising from the role of 
the dollar as international currency in the context of Bretton Woods II system.  
  16 
We  shall  now  proceed  to  illustrate  graphically  the  effects  of  changes  in  exogenous 
variables. 
a)  Increase in income and exports of Rest of World. Reduction in total return on 
assets denominated in currencies other than dollar. 
In this case the increase in net demand for US financial assets causes a current 
deficit and a revaluation of dollar-denominated assets (see Graph 1). 
Graph 1. Increase in foreign income and exports. Reduction in total return on foreign assets. 
 
This result is similar to Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2009), who argue that foreign 
demand for riskless US assets is a major cause of increasing speculative bubbles in US 
financial markets. Indeed, in the present model, the higher the liquidity preference of 
foreign investors the smaller the slope of demand curve and consequently the greater the 
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b)  Decrease in budget deficit, US firms expected real investment return and US 
income. 
In this case, the decrease in net supply of US financial assets produces a current deficit 
and a revaluation of dollar-denominated assets (see Graph 2).  
 
 
Graph 2. Decrease in budget deficit, expected real investment return and US income. 
 
It  is  interesting  to  note  that  appropriate  increases  in  budget  deficit,  real  investment 
return and income improve the current balance, but at the price of US asset devaluation. 
These results are not standard. They show that to avoid the simultaneous triggering of 
speculative bubbles and current account deficit requires that the credit received from 
abroad is used productively by government and businesses, or that the household debt is 
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c)  Increase in US interest rate. 
In this case the increase in international net demand for US financial assets and the 
simultaneous reduction in net supply produce a current deficit and a revaluation of U.S 
assets  (see  Graph  3).  This  result  depends  crucially  on  the  assumption  of  a  greater 
liquidity preference of foreign investors compared to residents. 
 
Graph 3. Increase in US interest rate. 
 
5. 1997-2007: the road to global crisis. 
 
The model presented in previous sections allows explaining the evolution of the US 
economy during the years preceding subprime crisis. The three stylized facts presented 
in section 1 are the result of a pattern of global development, began with the Asian crisis 
of 1997-98 and the switch to mercantilist policies by emerging economies, structurally 
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the US because of the unique status of dollar as international currency. The widening 
US external deficit has been the necessary counterpart of an increasing international 
demand for dollar-denominated financial assets (see graph 1). However, this fact alone 
is not sufficient to explain the outbreak of the crisis. The results may be different in 
terms  of  dynamic  stability,  depending  on  which  players  (firms,  households,  and 
government) absorb the excess demand for international liquidity. 
The pattern of global development has moved towards instability after the burst of dot-
com bubble in 2000-2001, when US non financial corporations have reduced their debt 
to reach a positive net stock position on credit markets. As shown in a study of the 
OECD, increase in non financial corporate net lending is a common feature for most 
industrial countries in recent years and generally, as standard macroeconomic theory 
suggests, it was positively correlated with a strong improvement in external balance 
(André  et  al.  2007).  What  distinguishes  US  from  other  industrial  countries  is  the 
existence of an inverse relationship between non financial corporate net lending and 
current account balance.  
This  apparent  paradox  can  be  explained  in  the  context  of  the  model  presented  in 
previous sections. Other things being equal, in the institutional arrangement of Bretton 
Woods II, a reduction of net financial liabilities of US nonfinancial corporations must 
be  offset  by  an  increase  in  US  household  net  borrowing  in  order  to  satisfy  the 
international net demand for dollar-denominated financial assets. This is made possible 
by  a  simultaneous  increase  in  current  deficit  and  asset  prices  which  may  lead  to 
prolonging boom in real estate and financial markets (see graph 2). 
What can explain the behaviour of US firms? The main suspect is a decline in the 
relative expected rate of return on investment within the US. In this regard, what matters  
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is not the absolute level of profits over the period that has historically been high in the 
global economy, but the opportunity cost of real investment compared to other forms of 
use of disposable funds. 
A well-known measure of relative expected future profitability of current investment is 
the “Tobin's Q”, i.e. the ratio of financial-market valuation of corporate assets to the 
current-cost value of the assets (Brainard and Tobin 1968, Tobin 1969). A Q ratio above 
1 indicates an increase in present discounted value of expected future profits on real 
investment and conversely a ratio below 1 indicates a decrease.  
As  shown  in  Figure  2,  in  the  period  1997-2007  the  movements  of  Tobin’s  Q  and 
nonfinancial  corporate  net  lending  are  clearly  negatively  related.  Starting  from  the 
bursting of the dot-com bubble, the Tobin’s Q becomes significantly less than one and 
simultaneously  the  position  of  nonfinancial  corporations  on  credit  market  improves 
rapidly from a net borrowing of 2.1% of GDP in 2001 to a net lending of 1,1% of GDP 
in 2005. Tobin’s Q could be a misleading measure of expected profitability when firms 
face  financing  constraints  (Bond  and  Van  Reenen  2007).  The  inverse  correlation 
between firms net lending and Tobin’s Q indicates that this is not the case in the period 
considered. Therefore Tobin’s Q is a good proxy of relative expected profitability on 
real investment of US nonfinancial corporations. 
The reduction in the relative rate of return of US real investment is also evident from 
other indicators. The unprecedented lending capacity of US non financial corporations 
was mainly directed abroad in the form of FDIs and this fact is a clear indicator of a 
lower  profitability  of  investments  in  the  US  than  abroad  (Moëc  and  Frey  2006). 
Empirical evidence on profit share confirms this interpretation. In the period 2000-2007 
the profit share on gross value added of US non financial corporations was respectively  
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10 and 11 percent points below EU 27 and EU 15 and this difference was reflected in an 
US non financial corporations gross investment rate (15,8% of gross value added) lower 
than EU 27 (22%) and EU 15 (21,9%)
8.   
 
Figure 2. U.S.Nonfinancial Corporations: Tobin's Q and net lending 
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In summary, over the period considered despite an increase in the global rate of return 
on physical capital due to a larger global supply of labor (Ferguson and Schularick 
2007),  the  distribution  of  returns  was  not  uniform  among  different  countries.  In 
particular, in the US the return on real investment was lower than other developed areas 
such EU and even more less than in emerging countries because of segmentation in the 
global market for produced capital (Daly and Broadbent 2009). This explains the excess 
saving of US nonfinancial corporations that has been used in ways alternative (FDIs and 
financial assets) to investment in physical capital. The profitability of US companies has 
                                                 
8 Eurostat (2009).  
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been  significantly  supported  by  gains  from  foreign  direct  investment.  However,  the 
profits generated by FDI reduce the net supply of US financial assets available for the 
Rest of World as they improve the current account. To this end, what matters is the real 
return on investment within the US that pushes companies to resort to debt financing. 
The  sharp  drop  in  relative  expected  real  investment  profitability  within  the  US  has 
resulted in a reduction of nonfinancial corporations net supply of financial assets to Rest 
of World. The increase in public deficit, which occurred since 2001, was not sufficient 
to offset this reduction and, in any case, budget deficit can not be the main source of net 
supply  of  international  liquidity  as  it  is  itself  subject  to  constraints  of  financial 
sustainability.  The  excess  demand  for  international  liquidity  was  thus  absorbed  in 
increasing proportions from households, through financial intermediation.  
The  growth  of  US  income  was  not  sufficient  to  avoid  a  significant  increase  in  the 
household  debt/income  ratio.  Because  of  significant  wealth  effects,  the  increasing 
indebtedness of households has been the basis for a continuing revaluation of US real 
and  financial  assets,  which  was  soon  transformed  into  speculative  bubbles.  The 
accommodative economic policy adopted by US authorities was the most appropriate at 
this juncture, as fiscal or monetary restrictions have resulted in a further accentuation of 
imbalances (see graphs 2 and 3). The model presented in previous sections provides a 
rational justification to the “benign neglect” approach of the Fed
9. European Central 
Bank also acted in the sense of reducing global imbalances through higher interest rates 
in EU than USA (see graph 1).  
                                                 
9 For a discussion on the validity of “benign neglect” see Bordo and Jeanne (2002) and Berger, Kissmer 
and Wagner (2007) 
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The inevitable transformation of US asset markets boom in speculative bubbles led to 
the crisis. Faced with “credit crunch” for households and firms resulting from subprime 
crisis, the explosion of public expenditure has  ensured the flow of international net 
supply of dollar-denominated financial assets. In this way, the Bretton Woods II system 
has  been  able  to  resist  the  global  financial  storm  (Bordo  and  James  2008,  Dooley, 
Folkerts-Landau  and  Garber  2009).  However,  the  restoration  of  financial  stability 
trough “twin deficits” can not represent an assurance in the long run. As Eichengreen 
(2005) suggests, a “banker of the world” with growing budget and current deficits is 
equivalent to “a bank with negative net capital”.  
The problem is not in the abstract whether the dollar can continue to be the global 
currency. The problem is whether the present international monetary system may stand 
in the long term. Today, international financial stability requires that the profitability of 
real capital in US is to appropriate levels compared with competing countries. In the 
next future, this situation can be reached through a substantial decrease in financial-
market valuation of capital assets. In the long term, however, only an increase in the 
relative return on US real capital, which brings US firms to the role of provider of net 
financial assets for Rest of World, can ensure the survival of the actual international 
monetary  system.  Indeed,  the  US  current  external  imbalance  is  under  control  and 
sustainable in the long run only if it corresponds to a productive use of capital inflows. 
The  country  that  issues  the  international  reserve  currency  is  not  excused  from 
complying with this standard condition. 
If  this  does  not  happen  Bretton  Woods  II  system  becomes  unstable.  On  this 
circumstance there are two possible ways: either the international monetary system fits 
the present model of global development, or is the model of global development to  
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adapt to the present international monetary system. In the first case the theme of a new 
international monetary order no longer based on dollar or other national currencies but 
on  a  form  of  supranational  money,  like  the  Keynes  proposal  at  the  Bretton  Woods 
conference,  is  the  subject  of  a  renewed  attention.  (D’Arista  2008,  Davidson  2008, 
Alessandrini and Fratianni 2009). In the second case, the theme concerns the transition 
of  emerging  economies  from  an  export-led  growth  model  based  on  mercantilist 
exchange rate policies to an economic development driven by domestic demand to meet 
the social needs of their populations (Roubini 2007).  
 
6. Concluding remarks. 
 
The crisis of 2007-2008 is not only the result of an improper and imprudent behaviour 
of financial operators and political authorities. Structural causes played a prominent 
role. They are related to the model of global development emerged after the Asian crisis 
of 1997-98. The Bretton Woods II monetary system, based on mercantilist exchange 
rate  policies  by  emerging  economies  and  an  enforced  status  of  the  dollar  as  world 
currency,  is  subject  to  precise  stability  conditions.  If  these  conditions  are  not  met, 
serious internal and external imbalances are being produced in the centre of the system, 
the US economy. 
The model presented in the previous sections helps to understand the basic requirements 
for Bretton Woods II stability. Given the institutional and structural characteristics of 
the system, US current account and dollar-denominated asset prices are endogenous 
variables  of  global  economy.  Exogenous  demand  for  international  liquidity  greatly 
interferes with internal development of US economy. Net supply of dollar-denominated  
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asset to Rest of World should have a particular sectoral composition so that not occur 
simultaneously US asset bubbles and unsustainable current deficits. 
The  excess  savings  of  US  nonfinancial  corporations  from  the  bursting  of  dot-com 
bubble has undermined the stability of the Bretton Woods II system. Accommodative 
US  macroeconomic  policies  have  mitigated  the  imbalances  but  in  the  long  term 
structural  factors  have  prevailed.  Increasing  nonfinancial  corporate  net  lending  was 
caused  by  a  reduction  in  expected  return  of  US  real  investment  compared  with 
competing countries. Only a recovery of real capital profitability within the US can 
provide long term survival of Bretton Woods II international monetary system. If this 
does not happen, the present model of global development is incompatible with the 
current international monetary system. Which one must adjust to another is a question 
more political than scientific. 
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